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L I S T OF A L L P A R T I E S
Plaintiffs named the Division of Juvenile Justice Services, Timothy
McOmber, Carolyn Nay, and John and J a n e Does 1-20 as parties to their
original Complaint. 1 Plaintiffs have not appealed the district court' s orders
dismissing those parties.

Carolyn Nay joined the Division' s first motion for s u m m a r y for
judgment that the district court granted on J u n e 11, 2009. Plaintiffs have
appealed from that order but they have not addressed any arguments
toward Ms. Nay or her dismissal. See Aplt. Br. p. 3 and generally; Notice
of Appeal, R. 500-501. Plaintiffs have therefore waived any claim they
may otherwise have respecting Ms. Nay. See Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT
89, If 23, 16 P.3d 540 (issues not presented in opening brief considered
waived); see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), (9).
-li-
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N o . 20090931-CA
IN THE U T A H C O U R T OF A P P E A L S

RYAN M O R F O R D and LENE M O R F O R D ,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
STATE of UTAH, DIVISION OF CHILD and FAMILY SERVICES,
Defendant/Appellee,

ANSWER BRIEF

The State of U t a h , Division of Child and Family Services (the Division)
respectfully submits this answer brief.

Jurisdictional Statement
This Court possesses jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4103(2)(j) (West Supp. 2009).

Issues P r e s e n t e d
1.

Failure to Comply with Appellate Rule 24.

The rules of appellate procedure require adequate briefing.

Plaintiffs

appeal from grants of s u m m a r y judgment, but they fail to cite to the district

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

court record, to identify a single material fact that Plaintiffs contend is in
dispute, or to provide any meaningful legal analysis of their claims before this
Court. Have Plaintiffs adequately complied with appellate Rule 24 such that
their brief should not be stricken?

Standard of review.
This issue requires no review of the lower court decision and no
standard of review applies.

2.

No Duty to Provide Reunification Services.

U t a h ' s Juvenile Court Act separately addresses minors adjudicated by
that court as abused, neglected or dependent from minors adjudicated as
delinquent. The Act contains provisions respecting reunification services to
parents of abused or neglected children, but not to parents of delinquent
minors. Here, B.M. was removed from Plaintiffs'

home and placed in the

S t a t e ' s custody because B.M. committed a delinquent act. Did the district
court err when it found the Division had no duty to provide Plaintiffs with
reunification services?

Standard of review.
Interpretation of a statute constitutes a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Blacknerv.

Dep' t ofTransp.,

2002 UT 44, Tj 8, 48 P.3d 949.
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3.

Immunity from Suit.

Plaintiffs relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights to B.M. while he was in the
S t a t e ' s custody and confined to a residential t r e a t m e n t center. Plaintiffs
claim that they did so because the Division negligently failed to offer them
reunification services. But Plaintiffs'

alleged injury arose out of B.M.' s

delinquent conduct and incarceration in a place of legal confinement, or
alternatively, from an alleged negligent misrepresentation. Is the Division
immune from Plaintiffs'

negligence claim?

Standard of Review.
This issue presents the same standard of review as issue no. 2, above.

4.

No Contract Exists.

Utah law makes clear that the burden of proving that a contract exists
falls on the party seeking to enforce it. Here, Plaintiffs merely point, by
n a m e , to documents they contend constitute contracts between Plaintiffs and
the Division. But Plaintiffs neither identify where those alleged contracts
were introduced in the district court nor explain to this Court why those
documents give rise to Plaintiffs'

contract claim. Have Plaintiff met their

burden here to show that a contract exists? 2

2

Related to Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is a claim that the
Division violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. But Utah
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Standard of review.
The existence of a contract presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f 16, 84 P.3d 1134.

Preservation of Issues
The adequacy of Plaintiffs'

brief presents an issue unique to this

appeal and no preservation requirement applies. The remaining, substantive
issues were raised in the s u m m a r y judgment pleadings. R. 279-392; 410-490.
The district court orders granting those motions and the court' s final
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs'

complaint with prejudice are attached at

Addendum A. R. 393-394; 403-405; 492-498.

Determinative Statutes
The following statutory provisions determinative to this appeal are set
out verbatim in Addendum B. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-250 (West 2009);
Id. § 78A-6-118;/*/. § 78A-6-312;/</. § 78A-6-401.

law makes clear that in the absence of a contract, no implied covenants exist.
See Savage v. Educators, Inc., 908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995) (an implied
contractual obligation cannot exist in the absence of an express contract).
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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S t a t e m e n t of t h e C a s e
Nature of the Case
Plaintiffs sued the Division for damages they allege to have suffered when
Plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights to a minor child
whom Plaintiffs previously adopted.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
Plaintiffs sued the Division and others in the Fourth District Court for
numerous common law torts and for breach of a contract and an implied
covenant of good faith. R. 1-25. The Division filed an answer, while other
defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs'

complaint. R. 69-102. Plaintiffs did

not timely oppose the motion and the district court issued a minute entry,
granting the same. R 119. Plaintiffs then filed an opposition m e m o r a n d u m ,
which the district court disregarded in its order granting the motion and
dismissing the moving parties from Plaintiffs'

suit. R. 136-139. Plaintiffs

have not appealed from that order. See R. 500-501.
The Division next filed a motion to dismiss all but Plaintiffs'

negligence

claim. R. 192-207. Co-defendant Carolyn Nay joined the motion and Plaintiff
filed a memorandum opposing only the Division' s contract a r g u m e n t s . R.

-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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208-212; 214-216. The Division submitted its reply and a notice asking the
district court to rule without oral argument. R. 220-233. The district court
did so on October 31, 2008. R. 236-238. The court dismissed the Division and
defendant Nay from Plaintiffs'

second, third, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth

and tenth causes of action. R. 238. The court denied the Division' s motion
as to Plaintiffs'

contract claims, but dismissed defendant Nay with prejudice

because there were no allegations that Ms. Nay entered into a contract or
other agreement with Plaintiffs. Id.
order. SeeR.

Plaintiffs also did not appeal from that

500-501.

Then in April 2009, the Division filed a motion and m e m o r a n d u m , seeking
s u m m a r y judgment dismissing Plaintiffs'

negligence claim. R. 278-332. Co-

defendant Nay joined the motion and Plaintiffs'

opposed it. R. 328-362. As

before, the Division submitted its reply and a notice waiving oral argument.
R. 369-392. In a J u n e 11 order, the district court dismissed Plaintiffs'
negligence claim against the Division and co-defendant Nay with prejudice.
R. 393-394; 400-401.
The Division next conducted discovery relative to Plaintiffs'

two,

remaining claims. In their response, Plaintiffs identified three documents
that Plaintiffs contended represent written contracts: 1) Adoptive Foster

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Agreement, dated July 28, 2004; 2) Adoption Agreement, dated July 2005,
and 3) Adoptive Parent Statement of Disclosure. R. 428-431, 451. 3
On the close of this discovery, the Division filed an additional motion
for summary judgment that Plaintiffs opposed. R. 410-460. There, the
Division sought an order dismissing Plaintiffs'

contract claims. Id.

Plaintiffs responded, contending that Division service plans also provided
written contracts to be enforced against the Division. R. 456-460. Plaintiffs
did not attach any plans or cite to any express provisions in their opposition.
Id.
The Division submitted its final reply m e m o r a n d u m , after which the
district court set the matter for a hearing and asked the parties to specifically
address whether a single provision contained in the July 2005 Adoption
Agreement gave rise to a contract claim. R. 461-469; 473-475. The Division
submitted a supplemental m e m o r a n d u m . R. 476-490. Plaintiffs did not.
The court heard oral argument on September 14, 2009, at the conclusion of
which, Judge McVey granted the Division' s motion. R. 491. The district
court entered its s u m m a r y judgment order dismissing the remaining contract

3

Each document was unsigned by Plaintiffs, a fact the Division
agreed to overlook for purposes of its motion for s u m m a r y judgment
only. R. 451, n. 1. For this Court' s reference, each document is set
forth in the attached Addendum C.
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claims with prejudice on October 2. R. 492-495. The court entered a final
judgment and order the same day. R. 496-498.
Plaintiffs timely filed a notice of appeal from the order dismissing their
first cause of action (negligence) and from the order dismissing Plaintiffs'
fourth and fifth cause of action (contract claims). R. 500-501.

S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S
B.M. was removed from his biological parents and placed in the S t a t e ' s
custody in April 2002. R. 22-23. In J u n e 2004, he was placed with
Plaintiffs'

in foster care. R. 23.

At that time, the Division notified Plaintiffs that B.M. had been the victim
of sex abuse and that B.M. had also been involved in a prior instance of
sexual misconduct. R. 23. B.M. remained in Plaintiffs'

care without

incident, and Plaintiffs adopted him in October 2005. R. 21-22. During this
time, Plaintiffs also became foster parents to another minor, J.G., who
resided with Plaintiffs from February to November 2005. Id.
Shortly after Plaintiffs adopted B.M., they discovered J.G. sexually
abusing their minor daughter. R. 2 1 . J.G. was removed from Plaintiffs'
home that day. Id. During a subsequent interview, J.G. disclosed that B.M.
had also engaged in sexual misconduct with Plaintiffs'

daughter. Id. B.M.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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too was removed from Plaintiffs'

home and was placed in the Slate Canyon

Detention Center pending a r r a i g n m e n t .

R. 298, Affidavit of Timothy

McOmber,1f 3.
B.M. came before the Fourth District Juvenile Court for an arraignment
hearing on December 13, 2005, where he admitted one charge of sexual abuse
of a minor and was adjudicated by that court as delinquent. R. 308,
Findings

Minutes,

and Order, entered December 13, 2005. The juvenile court placed

B.M. in the Division' s interim, legal custody and ordered that he remain
confined at the detention facility pending release to an appropriate setting.
R. 307-308. The court continued the matter for further disposition. R. 307.
At the disposition hearing held J a n u a r y 10, 2006, the juvenile court
ordered B.M. placed in the custody and guardianship of the Department of
H u m a n Services for appropriate " out of home placement" and named the
Division as the lead supervising agency. R. 298, McOmber Aff., \ 4; 306,
Findings

and Order, dated J a n u a r y 10, 2006. The juvenile court made no

orders directing the Division to provide reunification services. See R. 306,
generally.
Following that hearing and according to guidelines published by the Utah
Network on Juveniles Offending Sexually and input from Division personnel,
B.M. was moved from Slate Canyon to Progressive Youth, Inc., for residential
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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sex abuse t r e a t m e n t . R. 297-298, McOmber Aff. at f^f 4-5. Progressive
Youth provided B.M. with an alternative to continued juvenile detention. Id.
at \ 5. B.M. remained involuntarily placed at Progressive Youth until the
date of his court-ordered release in July 2007. Id. at \ 8.
B.M. next appeared in the juvenile court on April 12, 2006. R. 305. There,
the court continued its prior orders and set B.M.' s case for review on July 12,
2006. Id. On that date, the juvenile court received and reviewed a Court
Report, prepared by a Division caseworker. R. 301-303, Review Order, dated
July 12, 2006; R. 330-333, Quarterly Progress Summary Court Report, dated
July 10, 2006. That Report set out several " Service P l a n " objectives
pertaining to B.M., but none pertaining to Plaintiffs. R. 330-333. The Report
also indicated
There recently has been a concern that [B.M.' s] adoptive family
has disengaged with [him] and his therapeutic process. It seems
that Mr. and Mrs. Morford are stepping back from the whole
process involving [B.M.] to assess what level and how they will be
involved in [his] life. [B.M.] had made a comment that he did not
want to return home. It was reported that his comment was
made during a time of frustration and [B.M.] has since stated
that he does not wish to return home. This may be the catalyst
for the Morford' s withdrawal.
R.332.
At the close of that hearing, the court continued B.M. in the S t a t e ' s
custody for appropriate residential placement. R. 302-303. The court once
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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more made no orders respecting reunification services. See R. 302-303,
generally.
On July 19, 2006, the Division held a team meeting to address B.M.' s
continued needs. 4 R. 18, Compl, \ 45. Plaintiffs attended the meeting, after
which they determined to relinquish their p a r e n t a l rights to B.M. Id. at \ 47.
Plaintiffs formally relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights in a juvenile court
proceeding held August 30. 2006. R. 292, Order of Term ination of Parental
Rights', R. 293-295, Relinquishm

ent of Term ination of Parental

Rights.

Therein, Plaintiffs stated that relinquishment was in B.M.' s best interest;
that Plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily agreed to terminate their ongoing
and residual relationship with B.M.; and that as of the date of the
relinquishment, all of Plaintiffs'

" responsibilities for [,] obligations to and

rights in connection with" B.M. were terminated. R. 293-294.
Plaintiffs have never sought to rescind their voluntary relinquishment of
or the juvenile court' s order terminating Plaintiffs'

p a r e n t a l rights to B.M.

4

Plaintiffs also attended team meetings held to discuss B.M. and
his care on J a n u a r y 30, 2006 and February 2 1 , 2006. R. 420-421.
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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S U M M A R Y OF T H E A R G U M E N T
The district court correctly granted the Division' s motions for s u m m a r y
judgment because the Division neither owed Plaintiffs a duty in tort nor
under contract to reunify Plaintiffs with a delinquent child. Those orders are
sound and should be affirmed by this Court.
As a threshold m a t t e r , Plaintiffs have both failed to adequately brief their
claims before this Court or to provide this Court with any case law
w a r r a n t i n g reversal as a matter of law. Plaintiffs have not shown that any
material facts are in dispute. They have not shown that the Division owed
them a duty under U t a h ' s child welfare laws to provide reunification
services. And they have not shown the existence of a contract or any implied
contractual obligations respecting those services. The district court orders
granting s u m m a r y judgment are sound and they should be affirmed.

ARGUMENT

I. Plaintiffs' Brief Fails to Comply with Rule 24 of the
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appellate Rule 24 sets out the component parts of a proper appellate brief.
Plaintiffs'

brief fails to comply with that rule in a number of respects. The

Court may strike and disregard Plaintiffs'

brief in total, Utah R. App. P.

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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24(k); see Burton Lumber

& Hardware

1012; Burns v. Summerhays,

Co., 2008 UT App. 207, n. 5, 186 P.3d

927 P.2d 197, 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), or

alternatively, the Court may disregard those portions of the brief that fail
comply with Rule 24 and to presume, instead, the correctness of the district
court' s actions below. See Koulis v. Standard

Oil Co. ofCal.,

746 P.2d 1182,

1185 (Utah 1987).
Pertinent here, Rule 24 provides:
(a) B r i e f o f t h e a p p e l l a n t . The brief of the appellant shall contain
under appropriate headings and in the order indicated:

(a)(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged
and with parallel citations, rules, statutes, and other cited
authorities, with references to the pages of the brief where they are
cited.

(a)(5)(A) citation to the record showing that the issue
[presented for review] has been preserved in the trial court;

(a)(6) Constitutional provisions [and] statutes . . . whose
interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the
appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is
lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision
shall
be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) of
this rule.

-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(a)(7) A statement of the case
A statement of the facts
relevant to the issues presented shall follow. All statements of
fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by
citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
Utah R. App. P. 24(a).
In addition, Utah law makes certain that an adequate appellate brief is
one that goes beyond mere assertions and conclusory allegations. Instead, an
adequate brief contains a thorough identification of the issues and thoughtful
analysis of those issues, with citation to relevant legal authorities. See State
v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 22, 128 P. 3d 1179; Kram er v. State Retirement

Bd., 2008

UT App. 3 5 1 , 1 22, 195 P.3d 925.
Plaintiffs fail to comply with both the technical and substantive
requirements of that rule. In part, Plaintiffs fail to state whether or where
they preserved the issues presented on appeal. Plaintiffs have set out a
section entitled " Statutory Provisions and Rules," but they have failed to cite
to or provide a r e s t a t e m e n t in that section of the statutory provisions that
Plaintiffs argue elsewhere in their brief. Plaintiffs have also attached a
" Table of Authorities" to their brief, but that tables references none of the
authorities that Plaintiffs cite. Instead, the table appears to pertain to an
entirely different cause of action.

-14Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Substantively, Plaintiffs have challenged the district court' s grants of
summary judgment, claiming that a genuine dispute of the material facts
exists, but Plaintiffs offer no citation to the record below. See Aplt.' s Br. at
pp. 3-5, and generally. And perhaps most glaring, Plaintiffs have failed to
properly identify or to develop any analysis of the legal authority upon which
they base their claims. But Plaintiffs merely point to sporadic provisions that
they believe aid their appeal, without also informing this Court of the legal
basis for those claims.
Those reasons provide the Court with sufficient basis to strike and to not
consider Plaintiffs'

brief. See Utah R. App. P. 24. The Division asks that the

Court make a searching review of Plaintiffs'

brief and to strike it where

appropriate. See, infra, Point IV. Elsewhere, this Court should limit its
review to record facts that the Division has appropriately cited and which are
supported by reference to proceedings in the district court below, see Koulis,
746 P.2d at 1185, and to give credence to only those legal arguments which
are accompanied by thoughtful analysis. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 22; Kram er,
2008 UT App. 351,H 22.
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II.

The Division Did Not Owe Plaintiffs a Legal Duty and
Their Negligence Claim Fails.

The material facts are not in dispute and the district court' s s u m m a r y
judgment dismissing Plaintiff s negligence claim should be affirmed.

See

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Neither in the district court nor here on appeal have
Plaintiffs made even the barest attempt to dispute the Division' s statement
of material facts or to illustrate the existence of other, factual disputes
sufficient to preclude s u m m a r y judgment. Instead, Plaintiffs make only
unsupported, conclusory allegations that carry no probative weight and that
cannot create a genuine issue of material fact. See Rawson v. Conover, 2001
UT 24, | 33, 20 P.3d 876 (bald statements do not suffice to establish genuine
issue of material fact); Schunphase

v. Storehouse

Markets,

918 P.2d 476, 477-

78 (Utah 1996) (bare contentions, unsupported by specific facts raise no
material fact as will preclude s u m m a r y judgment) (citation omitted).

A. The Division had no duty to provide reunification
services on behalf of a delinquent child.
Plaintiffs claim the Division owed them a legal duty to provide
reunification services respecting B.M. But the Division urges that no legal
duty existed. In light of this legal dispute, Plaintiffs claim that a genuine
issue exists that is sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Plaintiffs err.
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" Duty is an essential element of negligence." Higgins v. Salt
County, 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993), reh ' g denied.

Lake

One party cannot be

liable to another in tort absent a duty. Yazd v. Woodside Horn e Corp., 2006
UT 47, | 11, 143 P.3d 283 (citation omitted). Moreover, the existence of a
duty presents a legal question for the court to determine. Id. at f 14. Here,
the Division possessed no legal duty to provide reunification services to
Plaintiffs and their appeal thus fails.

1. Plaintiffs Possess No Statutory Right to Reunification
Services.
U t a h ' s Juvenile Court Act is comprised of multiple parts that separately
address minors adjudicated by that court as abused and neglected from
minors adjudicated as delinquent. Pertinent here are Parts 3 and 4. Part 3
speaks to the needs of abused, neglected and dependent children and outlines
the rights and obligations owed by the Division to parents of the same. See
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-301 to -323 (" Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency
Proceedings").

As to those children and their p a r e n t s , subsection -312

addresses whether and when reunification services are appropriate. Id. §
78A-6-312. B.M. was adjudicated as delinquent, not abused or neglected, in
December 2005. Accordingly, Part 3 is inapposite here.
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By contrast, Part 4 states that " [t]he processes and procedures described
in Part 3 . . . are not applicable

to a minor who is committed to the custody of

the [Division] on a basis other than abuse or neglect and who [is] classified in
the division' s m a n a g e m e n t information system as having been placed in
custody primarily on the basis of delinquent behavior or a status offense."
§ 78A-6-401(l) (emphasis added). 5 Instead, " [t]he procedures described in
Subsection 78A-6-118(2)(a) [apply]." Id. § 78A-6-401(2). That subsection
contains no provision for reunification services, but contemplates that an
order vesting the Division with legal custody of a minor for reasons other
than abuse, neglect, and dependency " may be for an indeterminate term."

5

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-117(2)(c)(iii)(A) similarly states " A minor
who is committed to the custody of the Division of Child and Family Services
on grounds other than abuse or neglect is subject to the provisions of Title
78A, Chapter 6, Part 4, Minors in Custody on Grounds Other Than Abuse or
Neglect, and Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 2A, Minors in Custody on Grounds
Other Than Abuse and Neglect." Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-250 states, in
turn
(2)(a) The processes and procedures designed
to meet the needs of children who are abused or
neglected, described in Part 2 and in Title 78A,
Chapter 6, Part 3, Abuse, Neglect and Dependency
Proceedings, are not applicable to the minors
described in subsection (1).
(b) The procedures described in Subsection
78A-6-118(2)(a) are applicable to the minors
described in Subsection (1).
Id.
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Id.

Id. § 78A-6-118(2)(a). 6 Because B.M. was adjudicated as a delinquent child,
Part 4 thus controls.
In the court below, the parties focused on statutes governing abuse,
neglect and dependency. Plaintiffs focused on Section 78A-6-3 12(2)(A)(I),7
and the Division on Section 62A-4a-203(4)(b) (West 2009). That fact is
inconsequential. This Court may affirm the s u m m a r y judgment order on any
ground available the district court, " even if it is one not relied on below."
Higgins,

855 P.2d at 235; see Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, H 10, 13, 52 P.3d

1158 (court may affirm grant of s u m m a r y judgment on any ground apparent
from the record).
6

And like Part 4, Part 6 specifically addressees delinquency
proceedings involving criminal offenses committed by minors. It too is bereft
of any provision mandating or even describing discretionary reunification
services. See id. §§ 78A-6-601 to-606 passim.
7

In addition to their claims under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312, Aplt
Br. pp. 7-9, Plaintiffs contend that in the absence of a legal duty, the Division
undertook a gratuitous obligation to provide reunification services. Id. p. 8.
But see R. 330-333, Out of Home - Foster Care Quarterly Progress Summary
Court Report, attached as Exhibit D to Plaintiffs' opposition memorandum.
There is no evidence that the Division assured Plaintiffs that B.M. would
return to reside with them. The only evidence of B.M.' s permanency goal is
the court report itself. R. 330-333. And that report is unequivocal on its face:
at such time as he was able, the Division believed that B.M. should either be
reunified with Plaintiffs or be placed in the guardianship of relatives. R. 333.
The mere fact that the Division stated a concurrent permanency goal
disclaims any obligation on the Division' s part to reunify B.M. with
Plaintiffs. Further, even had the Division agreed to provide reunification
services to Plaintiffs as a gratuity, Plaintiffs voluntary extinguished that
gratuity when they knowingly and voluntarily relinquished their parental
rights to B.M.
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Here, the undisputed record supports the district court' s grant of
s u m m a r y judgment. B.M. was removed from home in April 2002 due to his
biological p a r e n t s ' abuse or neglect of B.M. R. 23. But he was removed
from Plaintiffs'

care in December 2005 due to B.M.' s own, delinquent

conduct. R. 298, McOmber Aff. f 3; 333, Quarterly Progress S u m m a r y Court
Report, If IV., dated 4/12/06; 425, Quarterly Progress Summary Court Report,
f IV, dated 7/10/06. This distinction is material and compels this Court to
affirm the district court' s grant of summary judgment.
Because B.M. was removed from Plaintiffs'
conduct, not Plaintiffs'

home due to his delinquent

abuse or neglect of B.M., the Division had no legal

duty to provide Plaintiffs with reunification services. Compare Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-6-312 to § 78A-6-401; see also id. § 62A-4a-250. In the absence of
a legal duty, the Division cannot be liable to Plaintiffs in tort. See

Higgins,

855 P.2d at 235; Yazd, 2006 UT 47, f 11. The district court' s grant of
s u m m a r y judgment is therefore sound, and this Court should affirm that
court' s dismissal of Plaintiffs'

negligence claim.

2. Plaintiffs possess no constitutional right to reunification
services.
P a r e n t a l rights constitute constitutionally protected interests. See Troxel
v. Granville,

530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (parental rights constitute Fourteenth
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Amendment fundamental liberty interest); In re. J .P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1375
(Utah 1982) (recognizing similar interest under the Utah Constitution). But
the issue here is not Plaintiffs'

p a r e n t a l rights, but their claimed right to

receive reunification services. On that point, this Court has previously held
that " [reunification services are a gratuity provided to parents by the
Legislature, and appellants thus have no constitutional right to receive
[them]." State ex rel N.R., 967 P.2d 951, 955-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citing
State ex rel. M.E.C., 942 P.2d 955, 959 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel.
L.D.S., 797 P.2d 1133, 1139 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 8
Because Plaintiffs possess neither a statutory nor constitutional right to
receive reunification services. Their claim here thus fails.

III.

Plaintiffs Concede that the Division Is Immune from
Plaintiffs' Negligence Claim.

Even assuming Plaintiffs could demonstrate the existence of a duty, the
Division possesses sovereign immunity from Plaintiffs'

negligence claim.

8

Stare decisis also compels this Court to conclude that Plaintiffs
possess no constitutional right to reunification services. In other parts of
their brief, Plaintiffs acknowledge that reunification services constitute a
" gratuity provided to parents," Aplt Br. p. 8. But without citing State ex rel.
N.R. or State ex rel. L.D.S., Plaintiffs urge this Court to find that they possess
a protected right to receive reunification services. " Those asking [the court]
to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion." See
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). Plaintiffs have done nothing
to meet that burden. Absent that showing, this Court must affirm the
district court.
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Utah courts take a three-step approach to determine whether the State
retains immunity from suit. See e.g., Hoyer v. State, 2009 UT 38, % 10, 212
P.3d 547; Peck v. State, 200& UT 39, 8, 191 P.3d 4. Plaintiffs ignore the first
two questions, but focus only on the third inquiry - w h e t h e r the Division has
retained its immunity from Plaintiffs'

second cause of action. Aplt. Br. p. 9-

10. That inquiry is dispositive and calls on this Court to affirm the district
court' s order dismissing Plaintiffs'

negligence claim.

Under Utah Code section 63G-7-301(5), the State plainly retains sovereign
immunity " if the injury arises out of, in connection with, or results from" one
of twenty enumerated fact p a t t e r n s . Relevant here are subsections (f),
retaining the Divisions' s immunity in the face of" a misrepresentation by an
employee whether or not it is negligent or intentional," id. § 63G-7-301(5)(f),
and subsection (j), immunizing the Division when an injury arises out of" the
incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city jail, or other
place of legal confinement." Id. § 63G-7-301(5)(j).
U t a h ' s courts have broadly interpreted the phrase " arises out of, in
connection with, or results from" and have found that it requires " only that
there be some causal nexus between the risk and the resulting injury."
Blackner

v. State, 2002 UT 44, f 15, 48 P.3d 949 (citing Taylor v. Ogden City

Sch. Dist., 927 P.2d 159, 163 (" term 'arising out of

. . . reaches further than
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'caused by' " ) . The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified that the State
retains its sovereign immunity " when 'but for' the act covered by the
[retainer], the harm would not have occurred." Hoyer, 2009 UT 38, | 25.
Plaintiffs do not seriously analyze that authority; instead, they concede the
Division' s immunity in two different ways.
First, Plaintiffs agree that B.M. was incarcerated in a place of legal
confinement as that phrase has been interpreted by U t a h ' s court; see Aplt.
Br. p. 9, and they concede that their claimed injury resulted, instead, from
another immune category - t h e Division' s alleged, negligent
misrepresentations to Plaintiffs. 9 See id. p. 9-10. Because Plaintiffs agree
both that B.M. was " incarcerated in a place of legal confinement" and that
Plaintiffs voluntarily relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights to B.M. " as result of
misrepresentations," Plaintiffs concede the Division' s immunity from their

9

Not only does this concession give rise to the Division' s immunity
under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(f), it raises an argument on appeal
that Plaintiffs have waived. In September 2008, the Division moved to
dismiss all but Plaintiffs' negligence claim, including Plaintiffs second, third
and ninth causes of actions predicated on the Division' s alleged negligent
misrepresentations. R. 192-207. Plaintiffs filed a memorandum opposing the
motion, but addressing only the Division' s contract arguments and none of
the Division' s immunity claims. R. 208-212. The district court granted in
part the Division' s motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' second, third, sixth,
seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth causes of action. R. 238. By failing to
respond to the Division' s claim at that time, Plaintiffs have not properly
preserved their ability to raise that issue here. Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT
45, Tf 16, 2 P.3d 442 (failure to raise argument in trial court precludes party
from raising it on appeal).
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negligence claim. Thus, even were this Court to find that the Division had a
duty to provide Plaintiffs with reunification services and that it breached that
duty by failing to offer those services, the Division is immune under Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-301(5)(f) and 0')- The Court should therefore affirm the
district court order dismissing Plaintiffs'
P.2d at 235;Bailey,

negligence claim. See Higgins,

855

2002 UT 58, Iff 10, 13.

IV- Plaintiffs' Contract Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.
Long-standing Utah law provides that absent a meeting of the minds, no
contract exists. Oberhansly

v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). That

law also makes clear that the burden of proving that a contract exists falls on
the party seeking enforcement. Id. Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Division
entered into and then breached a host of alleged contracts to provide them
with reunification services. Aplt. Br. p. 12. Plaintiffs neither cite to where
those agreements are contained in the record nor explain how those
agreements, or Utah law, supports their claim. The s u m m a r y judgment order
should be affirmed.
Utah law maintains that an adequately briefed argument contains the
appellant' s contentions and reasons with respect to the issues presented; it
includes the grounds for review; and sets forth citation to the authorities,
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statutes and parts of the record that the appellant relies on. -See Utah R.
App. P. 24(a) (9). To this end, Utah courts consistently hold that " to be
adequate, briefs must provide 'meaningful legal analysis.' " Lee, 2006 UT 5,
\ 22. Moreover, " bald citation to authority" that is devoid of analysis is not
adequate. Id.
Here, Plaintiffs'

briefing is wholly inadequate. Plaintiffs'

contract

claims are conclusory. They offer no citations to the record. They cite to no
legal authority. And Plaintiffs give this Court no thoughtful analysis. In
short, Plaintiffs'

contract claims fail to meet even the threshold

requirements of Rule 24. The Division therefore ask that this Court decline
to address the merits of those claims and to uphold the trial court' s grant of
s u m m a r y judgment.
Alternatively, and should the Court find that Plaintiffs have adequately
supported their claims, they nonetheless fails.

A.

The Division Service Plans Do Not Give Rise to a
Contract for Reunification Services.

Plaintiffs first allege that after B.M. was removed from them and placed in
detention and then with Progressive Youth, the Division entered into and

-25Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

breached a series of service plans with Plaintiffs. 10 But Plaintiffs failed to
properly identify or to introduce those plans in the court below or to point there, or on appeal - t o any case law holding that a service plan constitutes a
binding contract. 11
Instead and without producing the alleged plans, Plaintiffs assert that
they contractually obligated the Division
1. " [T]o place B.M. in an 'adequately supervised, safe and secure . . .
t r e a t m e n t facility."
2. " [T]o use its 'best efforts to return [B.M.] to [Plaintiffs' ] home
following his t r e a t m e n t , and to involve the [Plaintiffs] by giving and
accurate status reports of [B.M.' s] t r e a t m e n t "
and
3. " [T]o promptly notify Plaintiffs of any incident or injury during
[B.M.' s] t r e a t m e n t plan."
Aplt. Br. p. 12-13.
But in their answers to the Division' s interrogatories, Plaintiffs described
the support for each, respective obligation as 1) a juvenile court order placing
B.M. in a level 5 facility and Plaintiff s belief that B.M. would be placed in

10

A service plan is a statutorily required treatment plan the Division
creates for any child entering state custody. See Utah Code. Ann. § 62A-4a205 (West. 2009).
11

Moreover, the Division has searched for that authority and has
found none.
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that facility, 12 R.285-286; Answers to State of U t a h ' s First Set of
Interrogatories to Plaintiffs, Ans. to Int No. 6; 2) unspecified training that
Plaintiffs received, a court report, 1 3 and an undefined statute, R.284-285, Ans
to Int. No. 7; and 3) a Progressive Youth Supervisor, named Dawnya. R. 283284, Ans. to Int. No. 8.
It is Plaintiff s burden to prove the existence of contractual obligations.
Oberhansly,

572 P.2d at 1386. Here, Plaintiffs have failed to produce the

alleged service plans or to show that the alleged obligations were contained in
those plans. Plaintiffs have thus failed to defeat the Division' s properly
supported motion for s u m m a r y judgment and the district court' s order
should be affirmed. See Orvis v. Johnson,

2008 UT 2, f 8, 177 P.3d 600.

12

The juvenile court did not order B.M. placed in a " level 5 facility,"
but that court directed the Division to screen B.M.' s case for " an
appropriate out of home placement." R. 307-308. Plaintiffs have offered no
evidence that Progressive Youth did not constitute such a placement.
13

Plaintiffs contend that because the court reports provided that B.M.
had a concurrent permanency goal of reunification with Plaintiffs that the
Division was contractually bound to see that that occurred. But B.M.' s
concurrent " goal" was just that - a goal-neither a contractual obligation
nor a guarantee. It reflects only the Division' s judgment that at such time
as B.M. was rehabilitated and released from the juvenile court' s jurisdiction,
he should be reunified with Plaintiffs, or be placed in an approved kinship
placement. See also, supra n.7.
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B.

The Adoption Agreements Do Not Give Rise to a
Contract for Reunification Services.

Plaintiffs next claim that the Division breached various adoption
agreements by failing to inform them of B.M.' s sexual history, and by
interfering with Plaintiffs'

p a r e n t a l rights. However, Plaintiffs concede the

failure of their first claim and they fail to adequately support their second
contention. The Division addresses those claims in reverse.

1. The adoption agreement do not contractually obligate the
Division to provide Plaintiffs with post-adoption
reunification services.
Without more, Plaintiffs assert that the Division possessed a duty under
unspecified adoption documents to not interfere with their p a r e n t a l rights.
Plaintiffs claim that the Division breached those agreements by failing to
offer them reunification services relative to B.M.' s delinquency action, and
by manipulating Plaintiffs'

into relinquishing their p a r e n t a l rights to B.M.

The district court addressed only the first claim, but both claims fail,
i. The adoption agreements.
Plaintiffs do not distinguish among the various adoption agreements. But
as the Division made clear in the district court, to the extent it is a contract at
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all, only the document entitled " Adoption Agreement" pertains. 1 4 R. 430.
That agreement, dated July 2005, sets forth various responsibilities by
adoptive parents and the Division " to help facilitate the successful adoptive
placement." Id. And with the exception of paragraph 3 under the section
entitled " Agency Responsibilities", that agreement applies to the preadoption period only.
P a r a g r a p h 3 states " [t]he agency agrees to provide information, services,
and referrals during and after the supervision period to enable the family to
be successful in the adoption." R. 430, attached as Ex. C to the Division' s
Memorandum in Support of S u m m a r y J u d g m e n t . Admittedly, that
paragraph places some onus on the Division to cooperate with Plaintiffs to
reach a successful adoption. But the paragraph places no obligation upon,
nor any agreement by the Division to offer Plaintiffs post-adoption
reunification services that the juvenile court did not order or that Juvenile
Court Act does not require. See discussion at Point II, supra.

Moreover,

because Plaintiffs

14

The remaining documents address only the supervision and preadoption periods and on their fact, they have no application here. R. 429,
431.
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have failed to point here or in the trial court to record facts that support an
alternative interpretation of the agreement, Plaintiffs'
ii. Plaintiffs'

claim thus fails. 15

voluntary relinquishment.

Finally, in a single sentence argument, Plaintiffs claim that the Division
breached the adoption agreements by improperly manipulating them into
relinquishing their p a r e n t a l rights. Aplt. Br. p. 16. Plaintiffs do not detail
the offending conduct, but elsewhere in their brief, Plaintiffs claim that they
relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights to B.M. because the Division
misrepresented B.M.' s progress and also that B.M. no longer wished to live
with Plaintiffs. Aplt. Br. p. 15.
Plaintiffs'

first contention - t h a t the Division misrepresented the progress

that B.M. was making in his residential t r e a t m e n t - s t a n d s alone. It has no
support in the record and is insufficient to preclude a grant of s u m m a r y
judgment.
But Plaintiffs'

second claim - t h a t the Division misrepresented to them

that B.M. did not wish to return to their home - is rebutted by the record.

15

Below, Plaintiffs had both the opportunity and obligation to point to
facts sufficient to defeat the Division' s motion for summary judgment. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Were Plaintiffs unable to oppose that motion by
affidavit or otherwise, Plaintiffs could have moved under rule 56(f) for a
continuance of the summary judgment proceedings to permit them to obtain
those facts by deposition or discovery. Having failed to do so, Plaintiffs
cannot be heard to complain that a question of fact may yet exist.
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Namely, one week before Plaintiffs determined to relinquish their rights to
B.M., Plaintiffs were present in court when the juvenile court judge received
and reviewed a court report, wherein a Division caseworker stated:
There recently has been a concern that [B.M.' s] adoptive family
has disengaged with [him] and his therapeutic process. It seems
that [Plaintiffs] are stepping back from the whole process
involving [B.M.] to assess what level and how they will be
involved in [his] life. [B.M.] had made a comment that he did not
want to return home. It was reported that his comment was
made during a time of frustration and [B.M.] has since stated
that he does not wish to return home. This may be the catalyst
for the [Plaintiffs' ] withdrawal.
R. 330-333, Quarterly Progress Summary Court Report, dated July 10, 2006.
Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights on August
30. 2006 because that was their desire. R. 292, Order of Termination
Parental Rights', R. 293-295, Relinquishm
Rights.

of

ent of Term ination of Parental

It is undisputed that Plaintiffs have never sought to set aside that

relinquishment or to reinstate their familial relationship with B.M. 16 But the
record facts make clear that Plaintiffs relinquished their p a r e n t a l rights to
B.M. not because the Division tricked them into doing so, but because
Plaintiffs believed that relinquishment was in B.M.' s best interest; that
Plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily made the decision to sever that
16

Plaintiffs did not ask the district court to reverse or to set aside
their relinquishment in the action below, nor have they instituted any other
action seeking relief from the order terminating their parental rights.
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relationship; and that as of August 30, 2006 all of Plaintiffs " responsibilities
for [,] obligations to and rights in connection with" B.M. were terminated. R.
293-294.
Having voluntarily, knowingly and intentionally relinquished any and all
rights that they had as adoptive parents to B.M., Plaintiffs relinquished any
contractual right they may otherwise have had under the p a r a g r a p h 3 of the
adoption agreement. By relinquishing their p a r e n t a l rights to B.M., Plaintiffs
not only extinguished and waived any continued relationship that they had
with B.M., they extinguished and thus waived any ongoing relationship with
the Division as well. See In re Estate of Flake, 2003 UT 17, | | 310-31, 71
P.3d 589 (a contract waiver occurs when a party intentionally acts in m a n n e r
inconsistent with its contractual rights).

2. Plaintiffs concede that the Division provided them with
evidence of B.M/ s past history of sexual abuse and
perpetration.
Finally, at paragraph 11 of their complaint, Plaintiffs aver:
[B.M.] was taken into DCFS custody in April 2002 . . . because he
and other youths in his neighborhood were involved in an
incident of sexual behavior. It was discovered that [B' s] brother
had introduced him to such sexual behavior.
R. 23. And at paragraph 12, Plaintiffs agree that at the time B.M. was placed
in their care, the Division informed them about that incident of sexual
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misconduct. Id. But on appeal, Plaintiffs contend that the Division breached
several adoption-related contracts or documents when " the State of Utah
failed to inform [Plaintiffs] of B.M.' s sexual history prior to the adoption."
A p l t B r . p . 16. Plaintiffs'

own complaint belies that claim. Having admitted

that the Division provided Plaintiffs with information related to B.M.' s
history as both a victim and perpetrator of sex abuse, this claim necessarily
fails. The s u m m a r y judgment must be affirmed.

C.

The Adoption A g r e e m e n t s Do Not Give Rise to Any
Implied C o n t r a c t u a l Obligations.

Even despite the existence of a contract for reunification services,
Plaintiffs contend that the Division breached an implied covenant or good
faith and fair dealing. R. 7, Compl. \ \ 100-106. 17 But in the absence of an
express contract, no implied duties may stand. Savage v. Educators

Ins. Co.,

908 P.2d 862, 866 (Utah 1995).
The Utah Supreme Court has stated a " duty of good faith and fair dealing
is a contractual covenant[;] one that arises solely as an incident to contractual

17

In their opening brief, Plaintiffs mistakenly state that they possess
an implied contract. See Aplt. Br. p. 17. Furthermore, a party a cannot
enforce a contract against the state absent " very specific written
representations by authorized government entities." Anderson v. Pub. Serv.
Comm ' n, 839 P.2d, 822, 827 (Utah 1992).
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obligations." Id. Because here, Plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of
a contract with the Division, Plaintiffs have also failed to show they possess a
cause of action for the breach of an implied covenant. The trial court' s order
dismissing Plaintiffs' fifth cause of action is therefore sound. The Division
asks this Court to affirm it.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have failed to show that the district court erred when it granted
the Division' s motions for s u m m a r y judgment. Those decisions were correct
and the Division therefore asks this Court to affirm the orders granting
s u m m a r y judgment and the district court' s final judgment and order
dismissing Plaintiffs'

complaint with prejudice.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this 10th day of May, 2010.

Bridget K. Romano
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Appellee
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